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WHAT’S IN A NAME?: PROVING ACTUAL
DAMAGES FOR REPUTATIONAL HARM
IN TEXAS DEFAMATION CASES
WILL ONLY GET HARDER
Austin Brakebill*
WHAT is a reputation worth? King Solomon wrote in Proverbsthat “a good name is to be chosen rather than great riches.”1For businesses, a positive reputation attracts better workers to
companies, increases loyalty among customers, and adds intangible value
to a company on the market.2 According to Richard Branson, founder of
the Virgin Group of companies, “[i]f you do anything to damage either
your own reputation or your company’s, you could destroy your busi-
ness.”3 The problem with reputation is that while it clearly has value, it is
nearly impossible to put a dollar amount on it. This has recently become
painfully clear for plaintiffs in Texas defamation suits because the Texas
Supreme Court has made it much more difficult to prove damages for
reputational harm. As more people gain access to the internet and in-
ternet defamations become more prevalent, more plaintiffs will be faced
with the question of how to prove that their invaluable reputation has
been harmed and to what extent. Brady v. Klentzman and its four-justice
dissent do not make it any easier and will only cause uncertainty.4 This
article proposes a legislative solution based on statutory damages awards
from copyright law to ensure that plaintiffs with actual injuries can re-
ceive actual compensation even when it is difficult to prove their injury.
Where a plaintiff has met his burden for proving defamation, then a court
could presume damages according to the legislature’s guidance.
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2019; B.A. Baylor University,
May 2016. I would like to thank my fiance´e, Alexis Torres, for keeping my life in order
while I wrote this note. I would also like to thank Sean Kelly for his guidance on this
project in particular and the practice of law in general.
1. Proverbs 22:1 (ESV).
2. Robert G. Eccles, Scott C. Newquist & Roland Schatz, Reputation and Its Risks,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 2007), https://hbr.org/2007/02/reputation-and-its-risks [https://
perma.cc/LG5M-C6QS].
3. Richard Branson, A Bad Reputation Is Bad Business, CANADIAN BUSINESS (May
1, 2013), http://www.canadianbusiness.com/blogs-and-comment/a-bad-reputation-is-bad-
business/ [https://perma.cc/7VAP-HLR2].
4. See Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2017).
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LeaAnne Klentzman had a scoop on the antics of Wade Brady, the son
of the local Chief Deputy for the Fort Bend County Sheriff’s office, and
the questionable behavior in which the Chief Deputy engaged to cover up
these antics.5 Writing for the West Fort Bend Star, Klentzman described
how Wade Brady was stopped by a State Trooper and ticketed as a minor
in possession of alcohol (MIP).6 Then, on his way home from this inci-
dent, Wade was tailed by a DPS Trooper, who had to handcuff Wade in
his own driveway because he was so “unruly and intoxicated.”7 Accord-
ing to Klentzman’s article, Chief Brady repeatedly contacted the officers
involved in the driveway incident and intimidated them to give over any
tapes or notes related to the incident.8
Wade sued Klentzman and the West Fort Bend Star for libel and libel
per se, arguing that they maliciously published the story and that they left
out that he was acquitted of the MIP charge.9 Wade alleged that he was
asked to quit his job because of the article and that his friends told him
that people were saying it made him look like an entitled criminal.10 The
jury agreed with Wade and awarded him $30,000 for damage to his repu-
tation and a host of exemplary and punitive damages.11 On appeal, the
media defendants argued that no evidence supported the awards for
harm to Wade’s reputation.12 The Houston Court of Appeals held that
there was sufficient evidence of actual damages for injury to Wade’s repu-
tation.13 Both parties filed petitions for review, and, contrary to its recent
decisions, the court upheld the damages awards.14
Defamation comes in two forms: per se and per quod.15 Defamation
per se involves statements that are so obviously harmful to someone’s
reputation that general damages are presumed.16 However, only nominal
damages may be recovered unless the plaintiff offers evidence of the exis-
tence and the amount of damages.17 The amount of damages must “fairly
and reasonably compensate the plaintiff” rather than having “juries . . .
simply pick a number and put it in the blank.”18 This requirement is nec-
essary to protect the “vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms.”19
In contrast, defamation per quod does not presume damages, making
5. Id. at 881.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 882.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Klentzman v. Brady, 456 S.W.3d 239, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014),
aff’d, Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878, 888 (Tex. 2017).
11. Id. at 250.
12. Id. at 267.
13. Id. at 269.
14. Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878, 887 (Tex. 2017).
15. Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. 2013).
16. Id.
17. Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 259 (Tex. 2014).
18. Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142, 160
(Tex. 2014) (internal citation omitted).
19. Id. at 159.
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them an essential element of a claim.20 So, if a plaintiff wishes to recover
anything beyond nominal damages, then, regardless of whether the defa-
mation was per se or per quod, the plaintiff must prove the existence and
the amount of damages.
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, what counts as proof of actual damages for
the Texas Supreme Court is unclear.21 In Hancock v. Variyam, Dr. Han-
cock sent a letter attacking the character of his supervising physician, Dr.
Variyam, to the Dean of the medical school and to several members of
the accrediting body at the hospital.22 As a result, Variyam’s division did
not receive accreditation for its fellowship program.23 The Supreme
Court held that the denial of accreditation was insufficient to prove injury
to reputation without further proof that the letter caused the denial.24
Because there was no injury to Variyam’s reputation, there was no evi-
dence of damages either.
One year later, the Supreme Court made proving injury to reputation
more difficult in Waste Management of Texas, Inc. v. Texas Disposal Sys-
tems Landfill, Inc.25 Waste Management published an “Action Alert” al-
leging that Texas Disposal (TDS) ran a landfill in Travis County that was
environmentally irresponsible, while TDS was negotiating a contract in
San Antonio.26 In an opinion by Justice Willett, the court held that 271
pages of invoices summarized by TDS’s CEO showing lost profits and
additional expenses following the publication of the Action Alert were
insufficient because they did not quantify TDS’s injury.27 And exhibits
showing decreases in TDS’s base business after the statements were pub-
lished did not “reveal any quantity of damages” to the plaintiff’s reputa-
tion.28 The lost profits and decrease in business are “not the sort of
general damages that necessarily flow” from defamatory statements.29 So,
TDS failed to prove both the amount of damages and the causal link
between the Action Alerts and the numbers that TDS did provide.
Three months after Waste Management, the Texas Supreme Court
doubled down on this position. In Burbage v. Burbage, Chad Burbage
published statements in a small community accusing his brother Kirk of
abusing the elderly and the dead, committing fraud, and running his fu-
neral home without a license.30 In an opinion by Justice Green, the court
held that Kirk’s estimation of the value of the funeral home was insuffi-
cient based on Waste Management because it did not exactly quantify the
20. See Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 71.
21. See Burbage, 447 S.W.3d at 259; Waste Mgmt., 434 S.W.3d at 160; Hancock, 400
S.W.3d at 64.
22. Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 62–63.
23. Id. at 63.
24. Id. at 71.
25. See Waste Mgmt., 434 S.W.3d at 145.
26. Id. at 147.
27. Id. at 160.
28. Id. at 160–61.
29. Id. at 160.
30. Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 252–53 (Tex. 2014).
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reputational harm.31 That Kirk lost pre-paid contracts after the state-
ments were made was insufficient based on Hancock because Kirk testi-
fied optimistically that he would “like to believe that” people did not
believe the statements, which undercut his argument that the statements
and the contracts were causally connected.32
Against the backdrop of these three cases, Wade Brady’s lawsuit
against LeaAnne Klentzman seemed hopeless. Brady only presented
vague statements from witnesses that “people in the community . . . had a
negative impression of Wade after this article” and that his boss asked
him to quit, only to rehire him soon thereafter.33 Neither piece of evi-
dence demonstrates any causal relationship between the statements and
the alleged harm.34 Wade offered “no evidence quantifying [his] injury to
[his] reputation.”35 But in spite of these shortcomings, the court held that
Wade’s evidence was sufficient.36 This sudden shift on what evidence of
reputational injury is and is not acceptable invited a dissent from Justice
Hecht, joined by Justice Brown, and unsurprisingly, Justices Green and
Willett, who wrote the opinions in Burbage and Waste Management.37
To begin, the dissent pointed out that Wade not only failed to prove the
amount of damages but did not even attempt to do so.38 “[A]bsolutely all
the evidence” that Wade offered was an old man from the next town
over’s negative impression of Wade, the Sheriff’s testimony that Wade’s
boss was concerned with the article some time before asking Wade to
resign, and that Wade’s friends said that other people had told them that
the article made Wade look bad.39 Not a single word was offered to prove
why his injured reputation was worth $30,000. Additionally, the dissent
pointed out that just because the old man from the next town over had a
negative impression of Wade after reading the article did not mean that
he had a negative impression because of the article.40 “Post hoc is not
propter hoc.”41 Wade also never claimed that he was asked to resign be-
cause of the article.42 In fact, Wade was rehired by the same people, so his
reputation was obviously not injured that badly, if at all.43
At first blush, Brady v. Klentzman seems like a boon for plaintiffs
bringing defamation claims because the bar has apparently been lowered
for proving reputational harm damages. But rather than lowering the bar,
Brady and its dissent hide the bar altogether and will lead to confusion
31. Id. at 261.
32. Id. at 262.
33. Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878, 887 (Tex. 2017).
34. Id. at 890 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
35. See Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142,
160 (Tex. 2014)
36. Brady, 515 S.W.3d at 888 (majority opinion).
37. Id. at 888 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 890.
39. Id. at 888–90.
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and uncertainty for litigators state-wide. The majority did not overrule
Hancock, Waste Management, or Burbage; in fact, the majority cites to all
three in upholding the damages award.44 This seemingly contradictory
decision would be enough to give lawyers pause on its own, but the four-
justice dissent compounds the uncertainty. When a similar case to Brady
makes its way to the Supreme Court, the four dissenters only need to
convince one justice to join them to rule against the plaintiff. These four
justices could find a friend in Justice Guzman, who wrote the majority
opinion in Hancock.45 So an attorney must answer the question of
whether to go with the majority’s lesser standard and risk getting over-
turned by the dissenters plus one or, rather, to go with the higher stan-
dard and potentially waste time proving more than necessary.
This uncertainty is particularly troubling given the advancements being
made in internet and communications technology. As more people take
to the internet to air their grievances, more people and businesses will
feel compelled to file defamation lawsuits to remedy their perceived
reputational injuries.
A recent case coming out of the 134th District Court in Dallas County
serves as an example of the difficulties a hypothetical appellate attorney
would face.46 In Moldovan v. Polito, a newlywed couple posted defama-
tory statements about their wedding photographer on Facebook and In-
stagram because they believed that the photographer had breached their
contract.47 The newlyweds also took their grievances to a local news sta-
tion, which produced a video story that was viewed by over 350,000 peo-
ple.48 Due to an interlocutory appeal on a different issue, the Dallas
Court of Appeals was able to take an early look at the sufficiency of the
evidence.49 The court found that the news story views, negative com-
ments on the photographer’s Facebook page, and negative reviews on
wedding websites were “the cause of damages” to the photographer’s
reputation.50
After sending the case back down to the trial court, a jury found in
favor of the photographer and awarded $1.08 million.51 Part of that
award is made up of $70,000 for past reputational injury and $40,000 for
44. Id. at 887 (majority opinion).
45. See Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 62 (Tex. 2013). President Donald Trump
nominated Justice Willett to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and
Justice Willett was confirmed on December 13, 2017. James Blacklock, Justice Willett’s
replacement, is a conservative like his predecessor and will likely rule in a similar fashion.
46. See Moldovan v. Polito, No. 05-15-01052-CV, 2016 WL 4131890, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Aug. 2, 2016, no pet.); Jury Finds Newlyweds Defamed Dallas Wedding Pho-




47. See Jury Finds Newlyweds Defamed, supra note 46.
48. Moldovan, 2016 WL 4131890, at *10.
49. Id. at *1.
50. Id. at *10.
51. See Jury Finds Newlyweds Defamed, supra note 46.
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future reputational injury.52 Mental anguish and lost profits were split out
into separate damages awards, so neither are included in the award for
injury to reputation.53 If this case were appealed, the question for the
court would be whether it applies Brady and does not require proof of an
amount of damages, or whether it applies Burbage and requires some
proof of the amount of damages. If the court chooses the former, then the
award of $110,000 could just be the whim of a capricious jury as the court
cautioned against in Waste Management, and people around the world
would potentially be subject to liability for unpredictable amounts of
money if they comment on a Texas resident or business’s page.54 If the
court chooses the latter, then future plaintiffs would have to argue how
much money a “like” or a negative comment on Facebook is worth to
make their trip to the courthouse worth their time. These two options are
not options at all, and a third way is necessary to fix this catch-22.
Statutory damages based on copyright law could provide a workable
solution to this conundrum. Traditionally, statutory damages in copyright
law were meant to provide some remedy to copyright owners “when it
was difficult to prove how much damages they had suffered” from an
infringement since all that was required to recover was proof of an in-
fringement.55 Statutory damages serve the same compensatory and deter-
rent goals as the tort system.56 As a legislative solution, the preferences of
both potential plaintiffs and defendants would be taken into considera-
tion when determining the amount of damages allowed to be rendered
upon proof of defamation. However, it is not so easy to implement be-
cause, like copyright, defamation implicates First Amendment freedoms
of speech.57 Fortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. already provided a way to protect First Amendment freedoms
in defamation cases.58
The Court in Gertz held that actual malice was necessary to award pre-
sumed, i.e., statutory, damages for defamation, which is in line with the
holding from the famous New York Times Co. v. Sullivan case when me-
dia defendants are sued.59 This willfulness requirement is appropriate
given the purposes of statutory damages: “to punish and deter” defama-
tory statements and “to spare the plaintiff the difficulty of proving actual
damages.”60 By requiring willfulness, the legislature can be assured that a
defendant’s freedom of speech is not violated while ensuring that plain-
52. Id. Jury charge embedded at bottom of page.
53. Id.
54. See Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142,
159 (Tex. 2014).
55. Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM & MARY L. REV. 439, 446 (2009).
56. Id. at 499.
57. Bradley E. Abruzzi, Copyright and the Vagueness Doctrine, 45 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM 351, 400 (2012).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 400–01.
60. Id. at 400.
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tiffs who must ordinarily prove the nebulous value of a social media
“like” may recover fair compensation for their proven injury. If the legis-
lature is still concerned with undeserved awards even with the willfulness
requirement, the legislation could include a provision for courts to ask
parties to demonstrate why the damages are sufficiently difficult to
prove.61 By implementing statutory damages, the legislature would en-
sure that plaintiffs could recover for actual injuries that have been too
difficult to prove, while also protecting the First Amendment freedoms of
speech by following the Supreme Court’s prescriptions in Gertz.
If statutory damages were available during the Brady litigation, then
the present uncertainty would not exist. The only questions for the jury
would be whether the defendant published a defamatory statement about
the plaintiff, whether that statement was false, and whether the statement
was made with actual malice.62 Here, the jury found that the articles were
defamatory and false but were not instructed on actual malice—an over-
sight that would not have happened under the proposed statutory dam-
ages legislation. If Wade did prove actual malice, then the judge or jury
would award the statutorily prescribed amount and be done with the mat-
ter. With statutory damages, the subject case of this article would have
been done at trial.
The Texas Supreme Court’s ruling in Brady v. Klentzman highlights the
difficulty that plaintiffs have in recovering actual damages for injuries to
their reputations. While defamation per se presumes recovery of nominal
damages, if plaintiffs want to make their time in court worth their money,
then they must prove the existence and the amount of actual damages.
Brady v. Klentzman muddies the already opaque waters by seeming to
allow lesser proof of damages, but the four-justice dissent and existing
precedent will leave plaintiffs with no certain path forward. As internet
defamation makes actual damage to reputation even more difficult to
prove, the uncertainty generated by Brady will leave plaintiffs with no
real compensation for their real injuries. The value of a reputation is al-
most impossible to quantify; determining the value of an injury to a repu-
tation is even more difficult. Instead of requiring plaintiffs to put a
number on their good name, a legislative solution guaranteeing recovery
for clear cases of defamation would provide compensation for people
who would otherwise be left on their own by the courts.
61. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 55, at 502.
62. Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law Through Uniform
Legislation: The Search for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. REV. 291, 336 (1994).
